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Abstract—The Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) re-
cently adopted in the U.S. enables two tiers of commercial users to
share spectrum with a third tier of incumbent users. This sharing
can be further assisted by Environmental Sensing Capability
operators (ESCs), that monitor the spectrum occupancy to
determine when use of the spectrum will not harm incumbents.
Two key aspects of this framework that impact how firms may
compete are the differences in information provided by different
ESCs and the different tiers in which a firm may access the
spectrum. We develop a game theoretic model that captures
both of these features and analyze it to gain insight into their
impact. Specifically, we consider a priority access (PA) tier firm
has access to the both licensed band and unlicensed band, and a
general authorized access (GAA) tier firm has access only to the
unlicensed band. The PA tier and GAA tier firms compete for
users. Our analysis reveals that the amount of unlicensed and
licensed bandwidth in the CBRS must be chosen judiciously in
order to maximize the social welfare. We also show that a limited
amount of unlicensed access of PA tier firm is beneficial to the
user’s surplus as well as to the social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the U.S. FCC has finalized plans for the Citizens
Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) [1]. These plans enable
commercial users to use the 3.5GHz band (3550-3700 MHz)
when incumbent users (e.g., federal users and fixed satellite
users) are absent. Accessing this band in a given location is
to be controlled by one or more Spectrum Access Systems
(SASs), which are geographic databases that contain informa-
tion about the locations and spectrum utilization of users of
this spectrum. It is envisioned that in many areas, multiple
companies will operate approved SASs.1 Companies wishing
to offer service in that band must then register with one
SAS. Additionally, each SAS can utilize an Environmental
Sensing Capability operator (ESC). An ESC will utilize a
network of sensors to detect the presence (or absence) of
federal incumbent users, enabling firms to better utilize the
spectrum than would be possible under more conservative
exclusion zones.
It is also envisioned that multiple ESCs may be present in
the market.2 If these ESCs offer different qualities of spectrum
measurements, this in turn could impact the downstream
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competition of wireless spectrum access firms (SAs) who are
using the spectrum to serve their customers. A SA contracting
with a “better” ESC will be able to utilize the spectrum more
often and thus offer a higher quality of service, giving it a
competitive advantage. However, using such an ESC might
also entail a higher cost.
In addition to the information provided by an ESC, another
key aspect of CBRS is that there are two different tiers of
commercial access allowed: a Priority Access (PA) tier and a
General Authorized Access (GAA) tier. The PA tier provides
a form of licensed access in that a SA with a Priority Access
License (PAL) is given the exclusive right to use a portion of
the CBRS spectrum in a given location when the incumbent
users are not present. The GAA tier allows for a type of
unlicensed access by SAs: any SA may utilize spectrum that
is not needed by an incumbent or PA user. The guidelines
for this band also limit the portion of spectrum that can be
allocated a PAL, so that when incumbents are not present, a
portion of the band will be available for GAA use. Thus in a
given location there could be SAs that differ in both the tier
in which they access spectrum and the ESC from which they
acquire information. This raises many interesting questions.
Can different quality ESCs co-exist in a given market and
if so how do difference in their quality impact the resulting
market? How does the tier at which a SA accesses spectrum
impact the ESC quality it is willing to accept? How does this
impact the downstream competition among SAs? How much
of the bandwidth should be reserved for the PA tier? In this
paper, we study a stylized model of the CBRS ecosystem to
gain insight into these questions.
We consider a market in which SAs seek to utilize a given
band of spectrum in a given area which is shared in a manner
similar to that in the CBRS system. To utilize the spectrum
each SA needs to register with a SAS operators serving the
given area so as to obtain information regarding spectrum
availability at a given cost. We assume that each SAS operator
utilizes a different ESC to obtain the spectrum measurement
data used in its database. For simplicity in the following we
refer to the combined ESC/SAS operator as simply an ESC
operator.3 We differentiate the ESCs by both the price they
charge a SA and the probability that they indicate that the
spectrum is available. Given their choice of ESC, the SAs
in turn compete to serve end-users in a given area whenever
the ESC data tells them the spectrum is available. We capture
3The combined ESC/SAS operator could be a single firm that both
maintains a SAS and a ESC network or two separate firms that have a
contractual agreement. In this paper we do not address the details of such
agreements.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
10
19
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
6 F
eb
 20
19
2the differences in the tier in which an SA might operate by
assuming that the given band is divided into two portions: a
licensed band modeling the PA tier and an unlicensed band
modeling the GAA tier. To keep our analysis tractable, we
focus on a duopoly scenario in which there are only two
SAs; however, we note at several places where our analysis
could be extended to market with more participants. Further,
to highlight the impact of different spectrum access tiers, we
assume that only one of the SAs has a PAL enabling it to use
the licensed portion of this band (in addition to the unlicensed
portion), while the other SA can only utilize the unlicensed
portion.
We formulate a multi-stage game in which the SAs first
decide on the ESC to contract with and then compete for
customers. Our model for the competition among the SA’s
for customers is based on the literature for price competition
with congestable resources, e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7]. In these
models firms compete for customers by announcing prices;
the customers in turn select firms based on a delivered price
which is the sum of the announced price and a congestion cost
that depends on the number of users using a firm’s resources.
This type of model has been widely used to study competition
among wireless service providers including the work in [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Our approach is closest to
that in [14] which considers a scenario in which a service
provider can serve users using a combination of licensed and
unlicensed spectrum. Similarly, we consider a model in which
the SA with a PAL is allowed to use both the licensed and
unlicensed portion of the band when it is available. Similar to
[14], we model this by assuming that this SA’s customers are
served on the unlicensed band with probability α and on the
licensed band with probability 1−α. An important distinction
in our work from all of the above, is that we assume that the
given band of spectrum is not always available and that this
availability also depends on the information acquired by the
ESC. For this we build on our preliminary work in [15] that
also considers a setting where different ESCs sell information
to the SAs. However, [15] assumes that all of the spectrum
is unlicensed and thus does not address the different access
tiers as in our model. We find that adding these tiers to the
model significantly complicates the analysis and leads to very
different conclusions.
We initially characterize the pricing equilibrium under dif-
ferent possible ESC selections and subsequently examine the
equilibrium ESC selection. The first ESC selection we consider
is when only one SA obtains information from a ESC, while
the other SA stays out of the market (Section III). In this case
the one ESC in the market acts as a monopolist when pricing
its services and thus can extract all of the user surplus. We
next turn to the case where both SAs obtain information from
the same ESC (Section IV). In [15], we showed that when all
the spectrum is unlicensed, this type of ESC selection always
leads to zero profits for the SAs. However, in our setting,
we show that even if the licensed bandwidth is very small,
there exists an α < 1 that will ensure that the payoff of both
SAs are not zero under this ESC selection. Our analysis also
reveals that there is a threshold on α beyond which, the SA
that only has access to the unlicensed spectrum (say SA 2)
achieves a negative profit (and so would not want to enter this
market). The threshold decreases as the ratio of the licensed
band and unlicensed band increases, i.e., if a larger proportion
of the band is allowed to be licensed, then α must be more
constrained for SA 2 to achieve a positive profit. This suggests
that if the goal is ensure greater competition in a market with a
single ESC, then perhaps in addition to limiting the proportion
of spectrum that is licensed, one should also limit the amount
of traffic a license holder can place on the unlicensed band.
Subsequently, we characterize the equilibrium strategy when
the SAs obtain information from different ESCs (Section V).
We show that when the SA with licensed access (say, SA 1)
obtains information from the “better” ESC, it can drive the
profit of SA 2 to zero when the user valuation for service
is large enough. Nevertheless, in this setting we show that
when the user valuation is not too high and α is high enough,
SA 2 can attain a strictly higher payoff compared to the
scenario where the SAs obtain information from the same
ESC. On the other hand, when SA 2 obtains the better quality
of information, we show that if α is high, the payoffs of both
the SAs are always positive. This shows that if the ESCs have
different quality, then limiting α may not be needed to promote
competition.
We, finally, characterize the equilibrium choice of ESCs by
the SAs (Section VI). Our analysis reveals that if α = 0
(α = 1, resp.), the SAs will never obtain information from
different ESCs (same ESC, resp,). We show that, surprisingly,
when α is above a threshold, and the ratio of unlicensed
bandwidth to licensed bandwidth decreases to zero, the SAs
obtain information from different ESCs (Theorem 9). When α
is below the threshold, a monopoly arises. However, if the ratio
of unlicensed bandwidth to licensed bandwidth increases to
infinity, the SAs obtain information from the same ESC. Note
that if all the bandwidth was unlicensed, as in [15], there is
no equilibrium where both the SAs will select the same ESC.
In contrast, our analysis reveals that if the licensed band is
non-zero, and the unlicensed band is sufficiently large, in the
equilibrium the SAs will always select the same ESC.
We, empirically, characterize the payoffs of the SAs, the
user’s surplus, and the social welfare as a function of the ratio
between the licensed bandwidth and the unlicensed bandwidth,
and α (Section VII). Our analysis shows that user’s surplus
and social welfare are neither maximized when the licensed
bandwidth is too large nor when the licensed bandwidth is
too small compared to the unlicensed bandwidth. Thus, a
regulator may need to select the proportion of bandwidth for
licensed access judiciously. Note that the α = 0 scenario
is equivalent to the scenario where each SA has exclusive
access. Thus, the congestion should be minimum when α = 0.
However, interestingly our analysis reveals that α = 0 may
not maximize the social welfare, or the users’ surplus. Thus, a
limited utilization of the unlicensed bandwidth by PA tier SA
increases the social welfare as well as the user’s surplus.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a scenario in which two SAs denoted by SA
1 and SA 2 seeks to serve users at a given location using
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Licensed Band (L): Only 
PA tier SA can use 
Unlicensed Band (W-L): Both 
PA tier and GAA tier SAs can 
use 
Licensed Band (L): PA 
tier serves a fraction of 
users.  
Unlicensed Band (W-L): PA 
tier SA (SA 1) serves 1-a 
fraction of users.  
Fig. 1. The PA tier SA can use the licensed as well as the unlicensed band.
The GAA tier SA is only restricted to the unlicensed band.
a given band of spectrum with bandwidth W . This band of
spectrum operates under a three-tier spectrum access model
in which a bandwidth of L is licensed (i.e., at the PA tier)
and the remaining W −L is unlicensed (i.e., at the GAA tier)
(Figure 1. In order to use the spectrum, each SA must acquire
spectrum measurements from one of two ESCs and can only
use the spectrum when the ESC indicates that it is available
(i.e., it is not used by an incumbent). We next discuss the
market participants in more detail.
A. SAs
We assume that only SA 1 has access to the licensed portion
of the spectrum (bandwidth L), while both SA’s can use the
unlicensed portion (bandwidth W−L). Hence, SA 1 can serve
users using both the licensed and the unlicensed spectrum
(Figure 1). We model this by assuming that SA 1 assigns
users to the licensed band with probability 1 − α, and the
unlicensed band with probability α (Figure 1). We assume
that this decision is made independently for each user in any
given time instant, so that over a service period (say one
month), each user of SA 1 will spend approximately α of
the time using the unlicensed band and the remaining time
using the licensed one. Throughout the analysis, we consider
that α is exogenously determined. This could be specified by
a regulator or determined by some underlying technology. In
other cases, it might be determined by SA 1 strategically. If α
is set by the regulator, the regulator may want to maximize the
social welfare. On the other hand, if the SA itself decides α
it may want to maximize its own revenue. In Section VII, we
empirically show the values of α which maximize the social
welfare and/or the SA’s profit.
Each SA i, selects a price pi it will charge users and
also decides the ESC j ∈ {A,B} from which it will access
information. As is the case in the wireless market today,
we view the price pi as representing the amount users pay
for receiving long-term service from SA i (e.g.,the monthly
service price). As such these prices represent the service from
an SA averaged over this service period. Here we view these as
flat-rate prices, and assume that each SA only offers a single
service plan (which is reasonable as in our model the user
population is homogeneous).
Let λi be the number of users of SA i. SA i then obtains a
revenue of piλi and has to pay a price p˜j to the ESC it selects,
giving it a total payoff of
piλi − p˜j . (1)
If a SA does not obtain information from any ESC, it can not
enter the market and so its payoff is zero.
B. ESCs
Each ESC j obtains a payment of p˜j when a SA obtains
information from it. If no SA obtains information from an
ESC, the ESC’s payoff is zero. In this paper, we focus on
the competition between the SAs and so do not consider the
ESC as a strategic player. Specifically, we assume that p˜j is
an exogenous parameter to the model, and it is not a decision
variable.
We assume that the incumbent users utilize the entire band
W when present. The ESC in turn provides estimates of
the band’s availability. Each ESC estimates that the band is
available with probability qj , j ∈ {A,B} if the incumbent
is absent. We assume that ESC B’s estimation is of inferior
quality compared to ESC A. Specifically, if ESC B estimates
that the channel is available, ESC A also does the same;
however, the converse is not true, so that qA > qB .4 Each
ESC has a negligible probability of miss-detection, i.e., if the
incumbent is present, the ESC will never announce that the
spectrum is available.
C. User’s Subscription Model
We consider a mass Λ of non-atomic users, so that λ1+λ2 ≤
Λ. The users are assumed to be homogeneous so that each user
obtains a value v for getting service from either SA over the
service period. However, as in [9], [12], [8] users also incur a
congestion cost when using this service. The congestion cost
models the degradation in service due to congestion of network
resources. Here, we model the congestion cost for using a band
of spectrum with bandwidth B by x/B where x is the total
mass of users using that band. More generally, the congestion
cost could be given by g(x/B), where g(·) is an increasing,
convex function. Here, we assume this function is linear to
simplify the analysis, similar to [8]. The dependence on B
models the fact that a larger band of spectrum is able to support
more users.
Over a given service period, the congestion cost will vary
depending the information available to the SAs and the tier of
spectrum a user is assigned to. We assume that over this period,
SA’s are sensitive to the expected congestion cost, which is
taken by averaging across these parameters. Again, as we are
viewing the pricing and service choices of users as being over
a long time-horizon, this is a reasonable assumption. Recall
that a user also has to pay the price pi if it subscribes to SA
i. The pay-off of a user receiving service from SA i is then
given by
E(v − pi − x/B), (2)
where the E indicates that this is evaluated by taking an
expectation over the possible realizations of SA information
and the spectrum tier assignment. Users can also choose not to
4This means that ESC B’s estimate is a degraded version of ESC A’s
estimate. Alternatively, one can model the ESCs as making independent error,
with the respective probabilities. This results in a more cumbersome model
and so we focus on the former case here.
4purchase service from either SA, in which case their pay-off
is zero.
We also define a user’s ex post payoff to be the value in
(2 conditioned on a particular realization of the information
available to the SAs and the assignment of a user to a tier of
spectrum. For example, when a user receives service from SA
i and cannot use the spectrum (due the ESC indicating it is not
available), its ex post payoff is −pi. In the following, we will
discuss the ex post payoff for the other possible realizations.
A user’s pay-off in (2) can then be viewed as the average
of the possible ex-post pay-offs seen by that user (where the
probability of these different realizations will depend on the
ESC selection choice of the SAs).
We, first, discuss the ex post payoff attained by the users of
SA 1. If a user of SA 1 is served using the licensed spectrum
its ex post payoff is
v − p1 − (1− α)λ1
L
. (3)
If a user of SA 1 is served using the unlicensed spectrum, its
congestion cost depends on two components. The user will
face congestion from the other users of SA 1 which are being
served using the unlicensed spectrum, and it will also face
congestion from the users of SA 2 if SA 2 also has information
that the band is available. In this case, the users of SA 1
achieve an ex post pay-off of
v − p1 − αλ1 + λ2
(W − L) . (4)
If SA 2 does not know the band is available, the payoff of a
subscriber of SA 1 served in the unlicensed band is5
v − p1 − αλ1
W − L. (5)
We next characterize the ex post payoff attained by the users
of SA 2. SA 2’s users face congestion from the users of SA
1 that are served using the unlicensed spectrum if SA 1 also
knows that the spectrum is available, giving a pay-off of
v − p2 − αλ1 + λ2
W − L . (6)
Note that the congestion cost is similar to (4) since in this case
both the SAs know that the incumbent is absent. If the SA 1
does not know that the spectrum is available, SA 2’s users
only face congestion from themselves, leading to a pay-off of
v − p2 − λ2
W − L. (7)
D. Multi-Stage Market Equilibrium
We model the overall setting as a game with the SAs and
the users as the players. Each SA’s pay-off in this game is
its profit (cf. (1)), while each user’s objective is the expected
pay-off described in Section II-C. This game consists of the
following stages:
1) In the first stage, each SA selects one of the ESCs and
pays p˜j j = A,B or selects to stay out of the market.
5Note that λ2 is absent from the payoff term in (4) since SA 2 thinks the
band is unavailable.
	
ESC A ESC B 
SA 1 SA 2 
Users 
Selects price 𝑝"# Selects price 𝑝"$  
Selects 
price 𝑝% Selects price 𝑝& 
Fig. 2. In the first stage, the ESCs select prices to the SAs. After SAs choose
to obtain information from one of the ESCs, they select prices to the users.
The users in the last stage, subscribe to one of the SAs.
2) In the second stage, SA i selects its price pi knowing the
decisions made in stage 1.
3) In the last stage, given the first two stages’ decisions, the
subscribers will choose one of the SAs from which to
receive serve or choose not to receive service. We seek
to characterize Wardrop equilibrium which is a notion
used for non-atomic users.
We refer to a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game
as a market equilibrium. Figure 2 depicts the tiered market
architecture.
In the following, we, first, describe the scenario where only
one of the SAs obtain information from an ESC. Subsequently,
we consider the scenario where both the SAs obtain informa-
tion from the same ESC. Finally, we consider scenarios where
the SAs obtain information from different ESCs. In each case,
we characterize the market equilibrium in the second and third
stage via backward induction.
III. MONOPOLY SCENARIO
We, first, focus on the scenario where in the first stage
only SA 1 contracts with an ESC j (j ∈ {A,B}) while the
SA 2 stays out of the market, i.e., SA 2’s payoff obtained
from contracting with either ESC is negative. Subsequently, we
characterize the scenario where only SA 2 obtains information
from ESC j.
A. Third Stage User Equilibrium
Since SA 2 is not in the market, the expected pay-off of SA
1’s users is simply given by averaging over (3) and (5), i.e.,
qjv − qj α
2λ1
W − L − qj
(1− α)2λ1
L
− p1. (8)
Note here, we are averaging over both the probability a user
is assigned to the licensed or unlicensed band as well as the
probability that the spectrum is available. It follows that since
the users are non-atomic we have λ1 = 0 if p1 ≥ qjv;
otherwise, λ1 is equal to the minimum of Λ or the root of
(8).
5B. Second Stage Pricing Strategy
In the second stage with only SA 1 in the market, it simply
selects a price p1 to maximize p1λ1, where λ1 satisfies the
third-stage equilibrium conditions above.
Theorem 1. The unique second stage pricing strategy is
p1 = min{qjv/2, qjv − qj α
2Λ
W − L − qj
(1− α)2Λ
L
}. (9)
The resulting third stage equilibrium is
λ1 = min{ v/2
α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L,Λ}. (10)
From (8) and Theorem 1 we obtain the user’s surplus is
always zero in the monopoly scenario. Thus, if only SA 1
obtains information from an ESC, the user’s surplus is always
zero.
We also note that the payoff is not maximized when α = 0
or α = 1. Hence, if SA 1 would have chosen α, it would serve
the users using the combination of licensed and unlicensed
bandwidth. The payoff of SA 1 also increases as W − L
increases, or L increases. In Section VI, we show that if
0 < α < 1/2, and L is very large compared to W − L, the
monopoly scenario arises where only SA 1 obtains information
from an ESC.
C. SA 2 has a monopoly power
Note from (7) that when only SA 2 obtains information
from the ESC j, the expected payoffs of subscribers of SA 2
are
qjv − qj λ2
W − L − p2 (11)
The expected payoff of the subscribers is independent of α
since SA 1 is not in the market.
Note that the pricing strategy in the monopoly scenario only
depends on the congestion cost inflicted by own subscribers.
Hence,
Corollary 1. The monopoly pricing strategy for SA 2, and the
third stage equilibrium λ2 is the same as the monopoly pricing
strategy for SA 1, and λ1, respectively (stated in Theorem 1)
with 1/(W − L) in place of α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L.
Unlike the payoff of SA 1, the payoff of SA 2 only depends
on W − L and is independent of α. The payoff of SA 2
increases as W − L increases.
Similar to the scenario where only SA 1 is in the market,
in this scenario, the users’ surplus is also zero.
IV. BOTH THE SAS CONTRACT WITH THE SAME ESC
Next we consider the case where in stage 1, both SAs obtain
information from ESC j ∈ {A,B}.
A. Third Stage Equilibrium
When both the SAs obtain information from the same ESC,
they both always know that the spectrum is available at the
same time. Thus, the ex-post payoff of the subscribers of SA
1 in the unlicensed spectrum is given by (4). By averaging
over this and from (3), the expected pay-off of SA 1’s users
is given by
Π1S(λ1, λ2) = qjv − qjα
2λ1
W − L −
qj(1− α)2λ1
L
− qjαλ2
W − L − p1.
(12)
Again we are averaging over both the spectrum availability
(qj) and the assignment of users to the two bands (α).
Since both SA’s have the same information, the ex-post
payoff of SA 2’s subscribers is also given by (4). Thus, the
expected payoff of SA 2’s users is
Π2S(λ1, λ2) = qjv − qjαλ1
W − L −
qjλ2
W − L − p2. (13)
Note that since SA 1 serves the users with probability α in
the unlicensed band, the terms in the congestion cost for SA
1 due to the unlicensed band is multiplied by α. Hence, this
term is smaller than that of SA 2. However, the term due to the
licensed band can be larger if L is small compared to W −L.
If both SA’s serve traffic, then the users will be in a Wardrop
equilibrium [16], which specifies that
Π1S(λ1, λ2) = Π2S(λ1, λ2) ≥ 0.
Examining the terms in this equation, it can be seen that more
users will avail the service of SA i if v is large, and pi is
small compared to pj . If on the other hand, SA 1 does not
serve traffic, then it must be that
Π1S(0, λ2) < Π2S(0, λ2)
and the corresponding equation would hold if SA 2 does not
serve traffic. Finally it must also be the case that if some users
are not served (λ1 + λ2 ≤ Λ) then
max
i
ΠiS(λ1, λ2) = 0.
This last condition shows that the users’ expected payoffs are
positive only when the the total number of users of both the
SAs is equal to the total number of users present in the system,
Λ. Intuitively, users will avail service from the SAs as long as
the expected payoff is positive. Thus, if the total number of
users is less than Λ, the expected payoff must be zero.
Now, we state an observation which shows that if the prices
of the SAs are the same, a scenario can not arise where the
users only subscribe to SA 2.
Lemma 1. If p1 = p2 and λ2 > 0, then λ1 > 0.
Intuitively, SA 1 has a competitive advantage over SA 2
since SA 1 can use both the unlicensed and licensed bands.
However, SA 2 can not use the licensed band. Thus, if the
prices are the same, the congestion cost is smaller for SA 1
compared to SA 2 at least in the unlicensed band. Thus, the
number of subscribers of SA 1 can not be zero if λ2 > 0.
6B. Second Stage Equilibrium
Next we turn to the second stage pricing equilibrium. Our
analysis reveals that
• If α is above a threshold (T ), the price and number of
subscribers of SA 2 is zero irrespective of the value of v
(Theorem 2). Since SA 2 has to incur a cost p˜j to acquire
information from ESC j, its payoff is negative. Thus, SA 2
will be out of the market if there is a single ESC and α is
high.
When α is high, SA 1 also serves users using the unlicensed
spectrum with a higher probability. Thus, the congestion
costs of both the SAs become similar which leads to a price
war, i.e., the prices of both the SAs decrease. However, since
SA 1 also uses the licensed band, it still has an advantage.
Thus, though the price of SA 2 is zero, the price of SA 1
is still positive. This shows that regulation may be required
on the load a PAL holder puts on the unlicensed spectrum
to maintain competition if there is a single ESC.
• We also show that the threshold T increases as W − L
decreases compared to L. However, the threshold never
reaches zero. Thus, if W − L is small, the number of
subscribers of SA 2 goes to zero even for moderate values
of α. Intuitively, if W − L is small, the congestion cost of
SA 2 is also higher which reduces the number of subscribers
of SA 2.
When 0 < α < 1/2 and W − L is small compared to L,
the SA 2’s price also decreases to 0. Thus, SA 1 will have
a monopoly power. Hence, if the ratio W−LL is small, SA
2 will try not to obtain information from the same ESC as
SA 1.
• Our analysis reveals that if W−LL >
α
2(1−α) , both the
SAs select a positive price and have a positive number of
subscribers (Theorem 4). Thus, if the ratio W−LL is high,
and α is small, both the SAs will have positive number of
subscribers when both the SAs obtain information from the
same ESC. Note that if all the spectrum band is unlicensed
as in [15], the prices of both the SAs are zero when they
obtain infor. However, we show that for any L > , both
the SAs will select a positive price if α < 1.
• The payoff of SA 2 increases as α decreases since higher
α increases the congestion cost in the unlicensed spectrum
which in turn reduces SA 2’s demand. However, surpris-
ingly, SA 1’s payoff does not always increase as α decreases.
SA 1’s payoff is always higher than that of the SA 2’s.
• User’s surplus is maximized neither at higher value of W−L
nor at higher a value of L. Further, the user’s surplus is
neither maximized at α = 0 (i.e., when both the SAs do not
interfere with each other) nor at α = 1 . Thus, the regulator
has to again incentivize the SA 1 to utilize the unlicensed
band when there is a single ESC.
1) Results: We now describe the pricing results in detail.
We start with characterizing the scenario where the price and
the number of subscribers of SA 2 are zero if α is high.
Theorem 2. If W−LL ≤ 2α−12(1−α) , the unique second stage
equilibrium pricing strategy is
p1 = qj min{v, αΛ
W − L}
(
1− W − L
α
(
α2
W − L +
(1− α)2
L
)
)
,
p2 = 0.
The third stage Wardrop equilibrium is
λ1 = min{v(W − L)
α
,Λ} λ2 = 0. (14)
Note that the condition in Theorem 2 is clearly satisfied
when α is equal to 1. The condition W−LL ≤ 2α−12(1−α) is
equivalent to the condition α ≥ 2/L+ 1/(W − L)
2/L+ 2/(W − L) . Thus,
if W − L is smaller compared to L, the condition is more
likely to be satisfied for a smaller value of α. The condition
in the theorem is never satisfied when α < 1/2.
The number of subscribers of SA 2 is zero and only SA
1 has a positive customer base. Thus, the payoff of SA 2
is negative in this scenario since SA 2 still has to pay p˜j
for obtaining information from ESC j. However, SA 2 would
unilaterally deviate and may not obtain information from the
ESC. In that scenario, its payoff or profit is zero.
This result can be generalized to the case where there are
multiple GAA tier SAs and they obtain information from the
same ESC. The prices of these SAs must be zero since GAA
tier SAs only use the unlicensed band. If there are more GAA
tier SAs than ESCs, then multiple GAA tier SAs must obtain
information from the same ESC. Hence, the prices of those
GAA tier SAs have to be zero. Thus, those GAA tier SAs will
not enter the market in the first place. Hence, in equilibrium
the maximum number of GAA tier SAs must be less than or
equal to the number of available ESCs.
Also note that if v ≥ αΛ/(W −L) and W−LL ≤
2α− 1
2(1− α) ,
SA 1 obtains all the subscribers. Intuitively, if v is large
enough, the user’s expected payoff increases, hence, more
users will subscribe. The user’s surplus is zero in this scenario.
The SA 1’s payoff is not maximized at α = 0 or at α = 1.
We next introduce a parameter as a function of α. We, later,
show that if v exceeds the parameter and α is not very high,
none of the SAs have zero customers.
Definition 1. Let
β(α) =
Λ
W − L
 (2− α− α
2)(W − L)
3L
+
1− α2
3
(1− α)(W − L
L
+ 1)

+ Λ(1− α)
[
(
(2− 2α)(W − L)
3L
− 2α− 1
3
)
]
.
(15)
Theorem 3. If α2(1−α) >
W − L
L
≥ 2α−12(1−α) , and v ≥ β(α),
the second stage unique pricing strategy is
p1 = qjΛ(1− α)[1− α
3L
+
2− α
3(W − L) ]
p2 = qjΛ(1− α)[2− 2α
3L
− 2α− 1
3(W − L) ]. (16)
7In the third stage equilibrium,
λ1 =
p1
qj(1− α)2(1/L+ 1/(W − L))
λ2 =
p2
qj(1− α)2(1/L+ 1/(W − L)) . (17)
If α2(1−α) >
W−L
L ≥ 2α−12(1−α) , and β(α) > v, the pricing
strategy is the same as that in Theorem 2.
Note that β(α) is larger when the ratio W−LL is either too
small, or too large. The condition in Theorem 3 is less likely
to occur if W−LL is either too small or too large. Also note
that if v > β(α), λ1 + λ2 = Λ. Thus, all the users are served
by the SAs. The user’s surplus is also positive in this scenario.
Note from Theorem 3 that if v < β(α), SA 2’s price is zero
in the equilibrium since the equilibrium price strategy becomes
equal to the one stated in Theorem 2. Hence, SA 2 would
not obtain the information from the ESC in the first place.
Thus, the equilibrium where both the SAs obtain information
from the same ESC is also not sustainable if v < β(α), and
α
2(1−α) >
W−L
L ≥ 2α−12(1−α) .
Note that if W − L is small compared to L, the condition
v < β(α) is likely to be achieved. Further, if W −L is small
compared to L, the condition α2(1−α) >
W−L
L is also likely to
be achieved even for smaller value of α. Hence, if W − L is
small compared to L, the price of SA 2 becomes zero and SA
1 only achieves a monopoly.
We, now, show that both the SAs select positive price, and
have positive subscription base when α is small and W−LL is
large.
Theorem 4. If W−LL >
α
2(1−α) , the equilibrium is unique, and
both SAs’ second-stage prices are strictly positive. The user’s
surplus is positive only when v > β(α).
Thus, a small amount of licensed spectrum is sufficient for
any α > 0 to achieve the condition that SA 2 has a positive
revenue when it obtains information from the same ESC as
SA 1.
The user’s surplus is positive only when v > β(α). Note
from Theorem 3 that even when α2(1−α) >
W − L
L
≥ 2α−12(1−α) ,
and v ≥ β(α), the user’s surplus is positive. Thus, only
when
W − L
L
≥ 2α−12(1−α) , and v ≥ β(α), the user’s surplus
is positive. As we have mentioned, the inequality v ≥ β(α)
is satisfied only when the ratio between the unlicensed and
licensed band is not too large nor too small. β(α) also
decreases with α. However, as α increases the inequality
W − L
L
≥ 2α−12(1−α) is less likely to be satisfied. Hence, the
user’s surplus is positive only when the ratio of unlicensed
band and licensed band is of moderate values and α is neither
too small nor too large. Intuitively, if W − L is too small,
the price of SA 2 becomes zero and SA 1 enjoys a monopoly
power unless α = 1. On the other hand, if L is small, the
congestion cost is higher which decreases the user’s surplus.
V. SAS OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT ESCS
Next we turn to the case where in stage 1, the SAs
obtain information from different ESCs. We, first, consider
the scenario where SA 1 obtains information from ESC A,
and SA 2 obtains information from ESC B (Section V-A).
Subsequently, we consider the scenario where the SA 1 obtains
information from ESC B, and SA 2 obtains information from
ESC A (Section V-B).
A. SA 1 obtains information from ESC A
We, first, describe the third stage Wardrop equilibrium. We,
subsequently, characterize the second stage price equilibrium.
1) Third stage Wardrop equilibrium: We, first, characterize
the expected payoff of the users. Recall that when ESC
B estimates that the channel is available, the ESC A also
estimates that the channel is available. Thus, the subscribers
of SA 2 always face congestion from the fraction of the SA
1’s subscribers which are served using the unlicensed band.
However, the subscribers of SA 1 that are served using the
unlicensed band only face congestion from SA 2’s subscribers
when ESC B indicates that the incumbent is not present
(which occurs with probability qB). Thus, the subscribers of
SA 1 do not face congestion from the subscribers of SA 2 in
the unlicensed band with probability qA− qB . Thus, from (3),
(5) and (4), the expected payoff of the subscribers of SA 1 is
qAv − (qA − qB) α
2λ1
W − L −
qBα(αλ1 + λ2)
W − L −
qA(1− α)2λ1
L
− p1.
(18)
Note that the expected payoff of the subscribers of SA 1 is
not maximized when α = 0 or α = 1 rather at some value in
between 0 and 1.
Since when ESC B informs that the channel is available,
ESC A also does the same, it follows from (4) that the
expected payoff of the subscribers of 2 is
qBv − qB((αλ1 + λ2)/(W − L))− p2. (19)
The expected payoffs of subscribers of SA 2 always decrease
with α.
In a Wardrop equilibrium, the following must be true: (i)
If λ1 > 0, then the expression in (18) has to be non-negative
and the expected payoff from SA 1 has to be greater than or
equal to that of SA 2; (ii) if λ2 > 0 the expression in (19) has
to be non-negative and the expected payoff from SA 2 has to
be greater than or equal to that of SA 1.
If both λ1 and λ2 are positive, the expected payoff of the
subscribers is again identical for both SA 1 and SA 2. It is
evident that if p2 > qBv λ2 = 0; and if p1 > qAv, λ1 = 0.
Lemma 1 also holds in this scenario. Thus, if λ2 > 0, and
p2 = p1, λ1 > 0. The above result will lead to the fact that
SA 1 will never select zero price.
2) Second Stage Equilibrium: Our analysis reveals that–
• Unlike the scenario where both the SAs obtain information
from the same ESC, if the ratio η = W−LL is small and α
is high (Corollary 1), SA 2 sets a positive price.
• Unlike the scenario where both the SAs obtain information
from the same ESC, if v is large, the profit of SA 2 is
negative.
• Similar to the scenario where both the SAs obtain infor-
mation from the same ESC, in this scenario there exists a
8monopoly equilibrium where only SA 1 can serve a positive
number of users if 0 < α < 1/2, and W − L is very small
compared to L. Intuitively, when α is small and W − L is
small, the users’ expected payoffs are way better for SA 1
compared to SA 2.
We, now, describe the results in detail.
Theorem 5. The second stage pricing strategy is unique. If
(qA − qB)v ≤ Λ
W − L (2qAα
2 − 3qBα+ qB) + Λ
L
(2qA(1− α)2)
(20)
and
W − L
L
≥ qBα
2/qA + α− 2α2
2(1− α)2 , (21)
then SA 2 selects a positive price in the equilibrium.
Otherwise, p2 = 0 in the unique equilibrium.
The complete characterization of the pricing strategy is
omitted owing to the space constraint. The condition in (20)
indicates that If the difference between qA and qB is high,
the price of SA 2 may be zero. Intuitively, if SA 1 has a far
superior information, SA 2 must select a lower price. Also
note that if v is high, the price of SA 2 can also be zero. If
the valuation v is high, the expected payoff achieved by the
users is way better from SA 1 compared to SA 2. Thus, SA
2 has to select a lower price. Hence, if the valuation of users
is high, there may not be any competition between the SAs in
this scenario.
Note that the inequality in (20) is more likely to be satisfied
when either W − L or L is small. Thus, if W − L is small,
or large compared to L, the price of SA 2 will be likely to be
non-zero. Also Note that the prices of the SAs do not go to
zero as α increases to 1 unlike the scenario when SAs obtain
information from the same ESC if the inequality in (20) is
satisfied.
Note from Theorem 5 that if W−LL ≤ qBα
2/qA+α−2α2
2(1−α)2 , the
price of SA 2 is 0. If qB increases, the price of SA 2 is zero
for a larger range of values of the ratio W−LL .
When α >
1
2− qB/qA , the right hand side of the
inequality in (21) becomes negative, hence, the inequality
is always satisfied. Note also that from Theorem 2 that if
W−L
L ≤
2α− 1
2(1− α) the SA 2’s price becomes zero if both
the SAs obtain information from the same ESC. Thus, SA 2’s
price does not become zero when α is high unlike the scenario
where the SAs obtain information from the same ESC.
In the following, we evaluate the threshold above which SA
2 will prefer to obtain inferior quality information compared
to SA 1. Let αc be the lowest possible positive value such that
if α ≥ αc, the inequality in (21) is satisfied. αc is a function
of the ratio η. If η is high, αc is lower. Thus,
Corollary 1. If α ∈ [max{αc, 2/L+ 1/(W − L)
2/L+ 2/(W − L)}, 1] and the
condition in (20) is satisfied SA 2 will have a strictly higher
payoff when it obtains information from ESC B compared to
the scenario where both the SAs obtain information from ESC
A.
The inequality in (20) is achieved when W − L is small.
Thus, if W − L is small compared to L, and α is high, the
best response of SA 2 is to obtain information ESC B if SA
1 obtains information from ESC A. Note that for other values
of parameters, SA 2 may still have an incentive to obtain
information from ESC B rather than from ESC A.
B. SA 1 obtains information from ESC B
We now consider the scenario where the SA 1 obtains
information from ESC B and SA 2 obtains information from
ESC A.
1) Third Stage Wardrop Equilibrium: Since SA 1 now ob-
tains information from ESC B, the fraction of the subscribers
of SA 1 served in the unlicensed spectrum now always face
congestion from the subscribers of SA 2. Thus, from (4) the
expected payoffs of the subscribers of SA 1 are
qBv − qBα(αλ1 + λ2)/(W − L)− qB(1− α)2λ1/L− p1.
(22)
Note that the subscribers of SA 2 only faces congestion from
the αλ1 subscribers of SA 1 when ESC B informs that
the channel is available (which occurs with probability qB).
However, the subscribers of SA 2 do not face congestion from
the subscribers of SA 1 with probability. qA − qB . Thus, The
expected payoffs of the subscribers of SA 2 are
qAv − qB αλ1 + λ2
W − L − (qA − qB)
λ2
W − L − p2
= qAv − qB αλ1
W − L − qA
λ2
W − L − p2 (23)
In the Wardrop equilibrium we then have: (i) λ1 > 0, if the
expression in (22) is non-negative, and the expected payoff
attained by the users from SA 1 is greater than or equal to the
expected payoff attained from SA 2 (cf.(23)); (ii) λ2 > 0 if
the expression in (23) is non-negative, and the expected payoff
attained by the users from SA 2 is greater than or equal to the
expected payoff attained from SA 1 (cf.(22)).
2) Second Stage Equilibrium: We, now, describe the second
stage equilibrium. Our analysis reveals the following
• Unlike the scenarios where both the SAs obtain information
from the same ESC or SA 1 has a superior information, in
this scenario, SA 1’s price goes to zero when (qA − qB)v
is above a threshold T1 (Theorem 6). Note that since SA 1
has to incur a cost for obtaining information from the ESC,
hence, SA 1’s profit is negative. Thus, such a scenario is
not sustainable in the equilibrium.
• The Nash equilibrium is unique. Both the SAs serve positive
number of users if α is high and v is below a threshold.
Thus, unlike the scenario where both the SAs obtain infor-
mation from the same ESC, the price of SA 2 is positive
when α is high.
• If α is small, and W − L is small compared to L, the
monopoly scenario may arise where only SA 1 serves the
users similar to the previous scenarios. However, unlike the
previous scenarios, if qB is small, the monopoly scenario
arises for a smaller range of values of α. Intuitively, if qB
is smaller, SA 1’s market power decreases since the users’
expected payoff from SA 1 decrease.
9We, now, detail the results.
Theorem 6. The Nash equilibrium is unique. If
(qA − qB)v ≤ (2qA − 3qBα+ qBα
2)Λ
3(W − L) +
qB(1− α)2Λ
3L
;
(24)
and
W − L
L
≥ qBα
2 + qBα− 2qAα2
2qA(1− α)2 (25)
the pricing strategy of both the SAs are positive.
If the inequality in (24) is not satisfied, the equilibrium
price of SA 1 becomes zero and if the inequality in (25) is
not satisfied, the equilibrium price of SA 2 becomes zero.
Owing to the space constraint, we omit the complete char-
acterization of the Nash Equilibrium. Note from (24) that if
differences in the expected valuation (i.e., (qA−qB)v) is large,
the price of SA 1 may become zero. This is because, users
will achieve a higher expected payoff from SA 2 because of
the superior information.
Note that when both the SAs obtain information from
the same ESC. There is no equilibrium where SA 1’s price
becomes zero. Thus, SA 1 would have an incentive to deviate
and obtain information from ESC A in the first stage if
v is large. Hence, if v is large, the equilibrium where the
SA 1 obtains information from ESC B, and SA 2 obtains
information from ESC A is not sustainable.
Note from (25), if α ≥ 13−2qB/qA , the right hand side of
the inequality becomes negative. Hence at least when α ≥
1
3−2qB/qA , the inequality in (25) is satisfied. Since qB < qA,
hence, the price of SA 2 is positive for high enough α. Note
that the inequality in (25) is less likely to be satisfied if W−L
is small compared to L and qB is small.
Note from Theorem 2 that if
W − L
L
≤ 2α− 1
2(1− α) , the price
of SA 2 is zero when both the SAs obtain information from
the same ESC. Thus, unlike the scenario where both the SAs
obtain information from both the ESCs, the SA 2’s price is
positive when α is high.
VI. FIRST STAGE DECISION
We now turn to the first stage in which the SA’s decide on
which ESC, if any, to contract with. We first introduce some
notation.
Definition 2. Let pii(j1, j2) denote the payoff of SA i, i = 1, 2
when SA i obtains information from ji ∈ {A,B, φ}, where φ
denotes that the SA i did not select any ESC.
Using the above notation, a Nash equilibrium profile in the
first stage is defined as follows:
Definition 3. A pair of choices (j1, j2) is a Nash equilibrium
profile if pi1(j1, j2) ≥ pi1(k1, j2), and pi2(j1, j2) ≥ pi2(j1, k2)
for any ki ∈ {A,B, φ}, ki 6= ji.
We have already characterized the second stage equilibrium
pricing strategy, and the third stage Wardrop equilibrium for
each of the possible first stage decisions. From Definition 3,
in order to conclude whether a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium we need to compute the payoff of each possible
decision of a SA, keeping the decision of the other SA fixed.
If both the SAs can not attain a higher payoff by unilaterally
deviating from the strategy profile, the strategy profile is an
NE.
In the following, we describe some of the key characteristics
of the first stage Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 7. If α = 0, there is no equilibrium where both the
SAs obtain information from different ESCs. If α = 1, there
is no equilibrium where both the SAs obtain information from
the same ESC.
Thus, if α = 0, only one of the ESCs can exist and if its
prices are low enough it may sell information to both SAs.
On the other hand, if α = 1, in an equilibrium, the SAs
may obtain information from different ESCs. When α = 1
and the SAs obtain information from the same ESC, then
the congestion cost of both the SAs is identical irrespective
of the subscribers of each SAs. This leads to a price war.
Obtaining information from different ESCs enables the SAs to
differentiate themselves and reduces the likelihood of a price
war.
We, now, characterize the equilibrium when the ratio η :=
W−L
L goes to ∞.
Theorem 8. If p˜A is small enough, and the ratio η →∞, both
the SAs obtain information from ESC A in an equilibrium if
α < 1.
Note in [15] that there is no equilibrium where both the SAs
obtain information from the same ESC if α = 1 even when p˜j
is small. Surprisingly, we show that even a small amount of
licensed band will force the SAs to obtain information from the
same ESC. Intuitively, when W − L is very large compared
to L, the congestion cost of SA 1 is high compared to SA
2 for α < 1. Since the congestion cost in the licensed band
becomes dominant factor, thus, the expected payoff of users
are quite different even when the SAs obtain information from
the same ESC.
Since p˜A is small, thus, SA 1 would obtain information
from ESC A rather than from ESC B. However, SA 1’s payoff
decreases as L decreases. Hence, if p˜A is fixed, and positive,
for small enough L, SA 1 would not obtain information from
ESC A.
We, next, consider the scenario where the ratio η goes to
zero.
Theorem 9. If 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 , and the ratio η → 0, the monopoly
scenario arises where only SA 1 obtains information from one
of the ESCs.
If α > 12 , and the ratio η → 0, and p˜A, p˜B (p˜A > p˜B)
are small enough, there is an equilibrium where SA 1 obtains
information from ESC A, and SA 2 obtains information from
ESC B.
Thus, if the licensed bandwidth is very large compared to
the unlicensed bandwidth, the monopoly scenario arises where
only SA 1 exists in the market if α is small enough. However,
if α is larger, there can be an equilibrium where SA 1 obtains
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Fig. 3. The user surplus versus L for different values of α.
information from ESC A, and SA 2 obtains information from
ESC B. Hence, both the ESCs can co-exist if α is large
enough, and the ratio η is small enough.
Intuitively, when W − L is small compared to L, and α is
small, the congestion cost faced by the subscribers of SA 2 is
large compared to SA 1. Hence, SA 1 has a monopoly power.
However, when α is large, the congestion cost faced by the
subscribers of SA 1 also becomes higher. Thus, the SA 2 can
exist in the market albeit by obtaining an inferior quality of
information. Thus, multiple ESCs can co-exist only if the ratio
between the licensed bandwidth and unlicensed bandwidth is
high enough and α is high.
VII. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we numerically compare the profits of SAs,
the user surplus, and the social welfare as a function of α and
the ratio η = W−LL . This will enable us to determine the value
of α and L which should be set in order to achieve a given
objective.
We set W = 150 MHz. Note that this is consistent with the
current CBRS proposal[1]. We also set v at 10, qA at 0.6, and
qB at 0.4; p˜A and p˜B are set at 1, and 0.5 respectively.
A. User’s Surplus
Figure 3 shows that surprisingly the user’s surplus is not
maximum when W − L achieves its largest value for any α.
The user’s surplus increases as L initially increases; however,
it decreases when L exceeds a threshold. This contradicts the
intuition that more unlicensed spectrum will always benefit
user surplus.
When L is small, the congestion cost is high for SA 1. In
this regime, both the SAs obtain information from the same
ESC and serve a positive number of subscribers if α < 1.
Thus, if α < 1, the higher congestion cost in the licensed
band drives down the user’s surplus. When α = 1 the SAs
obtain information from different ESCs. However, for smaller
values of L, a monopoly arises where only one of the SAs
obtain information from the ESCs. Hence, the user’s surplus
becomes small.
On the other hand, if L is large, the congestion cost of SA
2 is higher. Thus, SA 1 has a competitive advantage when
α is small, enabling it to select a higher price. When α is
high, SA 1’s congestion cost also increases since the amount
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of unlicensed bandwidth is small. Thus, the user’s surplus also
decreases.
When the ratio η is neither too high, nor too small, the
total number of subscribers served by the SAs become equal
to Λ. Hence, the user’s surplus becomes positive. Note that
we have already shown that if the ratio
W − L
L
is moderate,
the user’s surplus is the highest. This is in accordance with
our theoretical results.
When α increases, the user surplus increases. This is be-
cause as α increases, the competition between the SAs become
more intense. However, the user’s surplus again decreases
when α becomes 1. When α becomes too large, the SAs put
more weight only on the unlicensed band and the licensed
bandwidth is wasted which reduces the user’s surplus. Sur-
prisingly, our result shows that if α = 0, i.e., when the entire
bandwidth W is split between the SAs, the user’s surplus is
the lowest. This suggests that if a regulator wants to increase
the user surplus, it should enforce an α which is not too high
nor too low and should select a moderate value of η.
B. Profits of SAs
Figure 4 shows that as L increases, SA 1’s payoff increases
except when α = 1. Note that when L is small, SA 1’s
congestion cost is higher, and so its profit is small when α
is also small. The congestion cost decreases as L increases,
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hence, the SA 1’s profit also increases when α is small.
However, as L exceeds a threshold, the SA 1’s profit decreases
when α is small. Intuitively, when α is small, the SAs obtain
information from the same ESC. SA 2, thus, selects a very low
price in order to have a positive subscription base when L is
large. Note from Figure 5 that the payoff of SA 2 decreases
drastically once L exceeds a threshold. However, if L becomes
too high and becomes almost equal to the entire bandwidth
W , the profit of SA 1 also increases since SA 1 becomes a
monopolist.
When α is high, SA 2 obtains information from ESC B
when L is high. Thus, SA 2 always exists in the market. Thus,
the profit of SA 1 does not increase much even when L is
high. Note that when α = 1, SA 1 only uses the unlicensed
spectrum. Thus, the profit of SA 1 decreases as L increases
since the unlicensed bandwidth decreases. Figure 4 also shows
that SA 1 may not always prefer α = 0. SA 1’s payoff is not
always maximized at α = 0.
Figure 5 shows that as α increases, the profit of SA 2
decreases. Intuitively, when α increases, the subscribers of
SA 2 face more congestion from SA 1 as SA 2 only uses
the unlicensed spectrum. Thus, SA 2 has to select a lower
price which decreases the profit. The profit of SA 2 also
decreases as L increases, as the unlicensed bandwidth is more
congested for all values of α. Note that when α = 1, the
SAs become identical in nature. However, the only equilibrium
is both the SAs obtain information from different ESCs. We
assume that SA 2 obtains information from ESC B (i.e., it
has an information of inferior quality). Thus, SA 2’s payoff is
strictly lower than that of SA 1.
C. Social Welfare
We denote the social welfare as the sum of the user surplus
and the profits of the SAs. Figure 6 shows that the social
welfare increases initially as L increases when α < 0.5.
The social welfare decreases when L exceeds a threshold.
This is because the profit of SA 1 and user surplus both
increase initially as L increases when α < 0.5. However, when
L exceeds a threshold, the user’s surplus and the profits of
SAs decrease. Thus, a higher value of L decreases the social
welfare. Note that the increase of social welfare with L is slow
as α increases. This is because when L increases, the increase
of profit of SA 1 is slower when α is higher.
When α = 0.5, social welfare almost remains constant when
L is below a threshold. When L exceeds a threshold, the social
welfare decreases. The increase of SA 1’s profit with L is
smaller as α increases. Thus, the decrease of SA 2’s profit
with α nullifies the increase in the profit of SA 1, and the
increase of the user’s surplus. When L exceeds a threshold,
the user’s surplus also decreases. Hence, the social welfare
decreases when L exceeds a threshold. When α = 1, the social
welfare always decreases as L increases. This is because when
α = 1, the SAs only use the unlicensed spectrum. Thus, the
profit of SA 1 decreases drastically as L increases.
Figure 6 shows that social welfare is not maximized at very
high values of L or at low values of L. Social welfare may not
be maximized at extreme values of α either. When the ratio
η is moderate, the social welfare is the highest. However, the
value of α that maximizes the social welfare will depend on
the ratio η.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We studied a model motivated by the emerging CBRS
standard which shows that differences in spectrum access tiers
and information about spectrum availability can have a large
impact on the markets that may emerge. There are many ways
this could be extended including modeling more firms or the
strategic pricing of the ESCs. Consideration of a dynamic
market where the SAs can obtain information from the ESCs
in a spot market is also left for the future.
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APPENDIX
We, first, characterize the price strategy when λ1 < Λ,
subsequently, we characterize the price strategy when λ1 = Λ.
If λ1 < Λ, then,
qjv − qj α
2λ1
W − L − qj
(1− α)2λ1
L
− p1 = 0 (26)
Now, using the above expression,
p1λ1 = p1
qjv − p1
qj
α2
W − L + qj
(1− α)2
L
(27)
Thus, the optimal p∗1 = qjv/2. Hence,
λ1 =
v/2
α2
W − L +
(1− α)2
L
(28)
Note that p1 = qjv − qj α
2λ1
W − L − qj
(1− α)2λ1
L
.
λ1 can be at most Λ. Thus, if λ1 = Λ, the price is
p1 = qjv − qj α
2Λ
W − L − qj
(1− α)2Λ
L
(29)
Note that this is the highest possible price with λ1 = Λ. Hence,
the result follows.
First, suppose that λ2 = 0 and p2 = 0. Note that if λ1 < Λ,
the user’s surplus must be zero. If the user’s surplus is same
as in SA 2, then
λ1 = min{v(W − L)
α
,Λ} (30)
and
p1 = qjv − qjα2 λ1
W − L − qj(1− α)
2λ1
L
(31)
Now, we show that it is an NE.
If the user’s surplus from SA 2 as same as in SA 1, then
we have
(1− α)αλ1 + λ2
W − L −
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1 − p2 (32)
Since
W − L
L
≤ 2α− 1
2(1− α) and
α
2(1− α) ≥
2α− 1
2(1− α) , thus,
W − L
L
≤ α
2(1− α) . Thus, we obtain
(1− α)αλ1 + λ2
W − L −
(1− α)2λ1
L
≤ 2(1− α)
2λ1
L
− (1− α)
2λ1
L
=
(1− α)2λ1
L
(33)
the inequality follows as λ2 = 0. Hence, from (32) λ1
increases as p1 increases. The highest possible p1 is given
by (31).
If λ1 = Λ, then λ1 is replaced b Λ in the expression of p1.
Now, we are only left to show that λ2 = 0 and p2 = 0
when
W − L
L
≥ 2α− 1
2(1− α) . We obtain the above in Theorem
3 and Lemma 2 which we have proved independent of the
above theorem. Finally, note that the result where Hence, the
result follows.
First consider the scenario that λ1 + λ2 = Λ, and both
λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0.
Since both λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, the user’s surplus from both the
SAs is positive and equal, thus,
(1− α)αλ1 + λ2
W − L −
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1 − p2 (34)
Replacing λ2 = Λ− λ1, we have
(1− α)αλ1 + Λ− λ1
W − L −
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1 − p2
(1− α)2λ1
W − L +
(1− α)2λ1
L
=
(1− α)Λ
W − L + p2 − p1 (35)
SA 1’s payoff is
p1λ1 (36)
From (35), we obtain the optimal p∗1 from first principle as,
p∗1 =
(1− α)Λ
2(W − L) + p2/2. (37)
it is also unique since p1λ1 is strictly concave in p1.
Similarly in (35) replacing λ1 with Λ− λ2, we obtain
(1− α)2λ2
W − L +
(1− α)2λ2
L
=
(1− α)2Λ
L
− (1− α)αΛ
W − L + p1 − p2
(38)
Hence, optimal p∗2 is given by
p∗2 =
(1− α)2Λ
2L
− (1− α)αΛ
2(W − L) + p
∗
1/2 (39)
Hence, from (37) and (39), we obtain p∗1 and p
∗
2. λ1 and λ2
are obtained from (35) and (38) once p∗1 and p
∗
2 are found.
Note that, the user’s surplus has to be non-negative which
we did not consider so-far. Since both λi > 0, thus, the user’s
surplus is the same from both the SAs. Hence, we must have
qjv ≥ qj αλ1 + λ2
W − L + p
∗
2 (40)
The right hand side of the expression gives the value of β(α).
Note that p∗2 < 0 if
W − L
L
<
2α− 1
2(1− α) , thus, the
equilibrium is not sustainable when
W − L
L
<
2α− 1
2(1− α) .
In order to prove Theorem 4, we, first, show the following
lemma
Lemma 2. If W−LL >
α
2(1−α) , andv < β(α), the equilibrium
is the following
p1 =
qjv(1− α)[ (1− α)(2− α)
L
+
α2
W − L ]
4(1− α)2
L
+
3α2
W − L
p2 =
qjv(1− α)[2(1− α)
L
− α
W − L ]
4(1− α)2
L
+
3α2
W − L
. (41)
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The third stage wardrop equilibrium is
λ1 =
p1
qj(1− α)2/L,
λ2 =
p2(α
2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L)
qj(1− α)2/L(W − L) . (42)
proof: We have characterized the equilibrium when λ1 +
λ2 = Λ in Theorem 3 and it is an equilibrium only when
v > β(α). We will now characterize the equilibrium when
λ1 + λ2 < Λ.
Note that when λ1 + λ2 < Λ, the user’s surplus is zero.
Hence, we have the following
qjv − qj α
2λ1 + αλ2
W − L − qj
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1. (43)
If λ2 > 0, λ1 > 0, the user’s surplus from both the SAs is
equal. Hence,
(1− α)αλ1 + λ2
W − L −
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1 − p2 (44)
From (43) and (44), one can solve for λ1 and λ2 in terms
of p1 and p2. Thus, one can obtain optimal p∗1 in terms of
p∗2. Hence, we obtain the equilibrium price strategy p
∗
1 and
p∗2. The rest of the proof is algabraic, and hence, we remove
it.
Now, we show Theorem 4. Note that the price of SA 2 is
positive as long as
2(1− α)
L
− α
W − L > 0 and v < β(α). We
have already shown that if v ≥ β(α), the prices of SAs are
positive if
W − L
L
≥ 2α− 1
2(1− α) . Since
α
2(1− α) >
2α− 1
2(1− α) .
Thus,
W − L
L
≥ α
2(1− α) ≥
2α− 1
2(1− α) . Hence, the equilib-
rium prices are positive. Hence, the result follows.
Before proving Theorem 5, we, first, introduce the following
two lemmas
Lemma 3. The only equilibrium where λ1 + λ2 = Λ is the
following,
p1 =
(qA − qB)v
3
+
(qAα
2 − 3qBα+ 2qB)Λ
3(W − L) +
qA(1− α)2Λ
3L
p2 =
(qB − qA)v
3
+
(2qAα
2 − 3qBα+ qB)Λ
3(W − L)) +
2qA(1− α)2Λ
3L
(45)
Under the second stage pricing strategy profile, the third stage
Wardrop equilibrium is
λ1 =
p1
qAα
2
W − L +
qA(1− α)2
L
+
qB(1− 2α)
W − L
λ2 =
p2
qAα
2
W − L +
qA(1− α)2
L
+
qB(1− 2α)
W − L
(46)
and
(qA − qB)v
3
≤ (2qAα
2 − 3qBα+ qB)Λ
3(W − L)) +
2qA(1− α)2Λ
3L
(47)
qBv ≥ p2 + qBαλ1/(W − L) + qBλ2/(W − L) (48)
Proof: Since λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, the user’s surplus must be the
same from the SAs. Thus, we have
(qA − qB)v − (qA − qB) α
2λ1
W − L + qB(1− α)
αλ1 + λ2
W − L
− qA (1− α)
2λ1
L
= p1 − p2 (49)
Since λ1 + λ2 = Λ, we obtain both λ1, λ2 in terms of p1, p2
similar to the one we obtained while proving Theorem 3.
Hence, we obtain optimal p∗1, p
∗
2 since the expression piλi is
concave in pi. The rest of the proof is algabraic, and we omit
it here.
Note that p2 is only positive when (47) is satisfied. On the
other hand, we must have the user’s surplus is positive which
leads to the inequality in (48). Hence, the result follows.
We, now, state another Lemma which we use to prove
Theorem 5.
Lemma 4. The only equilibrium where λ1 + λ2 < Λ, if
W − L
L
≥ qBα
2/qA + α− 2α2
2(1− α)2 , (50)
and the second stage pricing strategy is
p1 = v
2q2Aα
2 − qAqBα3 − qAqBα2
W − L +
(2q2A − qBqAα)(1− α)2
L
4qA[α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L]− qBα2/(W − L)]
p2 = v
2qAqBα
2 − qBqAα− q2Bα2
W − L +
2qAqB(1− α)2
L
4qA[α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L]− qBα2/(W − L)]
(51)
and the condition in (48) is not satisfied.
Proof: We proceed similar to Lemma 2. When λ1 > 0, λ2 >
0, the user’s surplus must be equal for both the SAs. Hence,
(qA − qB)v − (qA − qB) α
2λ1
W − L + qB(1− α)
αλ1 + λ2
W − L −
qA
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1 − p2 (52)
Since λ1 + λ2 < Λ, thus, we must have the user’s surplus as
zero. Hence,
qAv − (qA − qB) α
2λ1
W − L − qB
α2λ1 + αλ2
W − L − qA
(1− α)2λ1
L
= p1
(53)
We obtain λ1, λ2 in terms of p1, p2 from the above two
expressions. We, thus, obtain the optimal p∗i i = 1, 2 by
differentiating piλi since piλi is strictly concave in pi. Note
that optimal p∗i is a function of both p1, p2. Thus, by replacing
p∗2 in p
∗
1 we obtain the equilibrium price p
∗
1 devoid of p
∗
2.
Similarly, we obtain the equilibrium price p∗2. Since the steps
are algabraic, we omit it here.
Note that the price of p2 is only positive when the inequality
in (50) is satisfied. When the inequality in (48) is not satisfied
λ1 + λ2 < Λ as otherwise we will operate in the regime of
Lemma 3. Hence, result follows.
Now, we prove Theorem 5. Note from Lemma 3 that the
price strategy of SA 2 is positive as long as the condition in
(20) is satisfied. Note from Lemma 4 that the price strategy of
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SA 2 is positive as long as the condition in (21) is satisfied.
The price strategy of SA 1 is always positive from Lemmas 4
and 3. Hence, the result follows.
We again start with two Lemmas which we use to prove
Theorem 6.
Lemma 5. Consider the following pricing strategy
p1 =
(qB − qA)v
3
+
(2qA − 3qBα+ qBα2)Λ
3(W − L) +
qB(1− α)2Λ
3L
p2 =
(qA − qB)v
3
+
(2qBα
2 − 3qBα+ qA)Λ
3(W − L) +
2qB(1− α)2Λ
3L
(54)
Under the above pricing strategy, the third stage Wardrop
equilibrium is
λ1 =
p1
qBα
2
W − L +
q2B(1− α)2
L
qA − 2qBα
W − L
λ2 =
p2
qBα
2
W − L +
q2B(1− α)2
L
qA − 2qBα
W − L
The pricing strategy stated in (54) is the unique Nash equilib-
rium if the following hold
(qA − qB)v ≤ (2qA − 3qBα+ qBα
2)Λ
3(W − L) +
qB(1− α)2Λ
3L
;
(55)
and
qAv ≥ p2 + qBαλ1
W − L + qA
λ2
W − L. (56)
and the above price strategy is the only one where λ1 +λ2 =
Λ.
Thus, if the inequality in (24) the price of SA 1 must be 0.
The proof of the above lemma is similar to Lemma 3. Hence,
we omit it here.
Lemma 6. The unique second stage pricing strategy is
p1 =
v(
2qBqAα
2 − qBqAα3 − q2Bα2
W − L +
(1− α)2(2− α)qAqB
L
)
4qA[α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L]− qBα2/(W − L)
p2 =
v(
2q2Aα
2 − qAqBα2 − qAqBα
W − L +
2q2A(1− α)2
L
)
4qA[α2/(W − L) + (1− α)2/L]− qBα2/(W − L)
(57)
if
W − L
L
≥ qBα
2 + qBα− 2qAα2
2qA(1− α)2 (58)
and λ1 + λ2 < Λ.
proof: The proof of the above lemma is similar to the proof
of Lemma 4. Hence, we omit it here.
Now, we show Theorem 6. Note from Lemma 5 that p1 is
positive in the inequality in (24) is satisfied. Note that p2 > 0
only when the inequality in (50) is satisfied by Lemma 6.
When λ1 + λ2 < Λ, the price strategy p1 is always positive.
Also note that when λ1 + λ2 = Λ, the price strategy p2 is
always positive from Lemma 5. Hence, the result follows.
Note that if α = 1, and both the SAs obtain information
from the same ESC, the prices of both the SAs become
zero. However, SAs have pay the ESCs. Hence, there is no
equilibrium where both the SAs obtain information from the
same ESC when α = 1.
On the other hand if α = 0, and suppose that SA i obtains
information from ESC B, and SA j, j 6= i obtains information
from ESC A. Then, SA i can obtain strictly higher payoff
by obtaining information from ESC A. Hence, there is no
equilibrium where the SAs obtain information from different
ESCs when α = 0.
Note that when α < 1,and
W − L
L
→ ∞, the equilibrium
prices of both the SAs is positive by Theorem 4. Further, when
β(α) → ∞ when W − L
L
→ ∞. Hence, by Lemma 2, the
payoff of each of the SAs when they obtain information from
the same ESC A is given by if α < 1,
pi1(A,A) = LqA
v2(2− α)2
16(1− α)2 − p˜A
pi2(A,A) = (W − L)qA v
2(1− α)2
4
− p˜A (59)
On the other hand, if SA 1 obtains information from ESC
A, and SA 2 obtains information from ESC B, the payoffs are
pi1(A,B) = L
v2(2qA − qBα)2
16qAqB(1− α)2 − p˜Api2(A,B) = (W − L)qB
v2(1− α)2
4
− p˜B
Since qB < qA, and p˜A is small enough, thus, the SA 2 will
not obtain information from ESC B, rather, it can attain a
higher payoff by obtaining information from ESC A.
If SA 1 obtains information from ESC B, and SA 2 obtains
information from ESC A, the payoffs are
pi1(B,A) = LqB
v2(2− α)2
16(1− α)2 − p˜B
pi2(B,A) = (W − L)qA v
2(1− α)2
4
− p˜A (60)
Since qB < qA, and p˜A is small enough, the SA 1 will have
a strictly higher payoff by obtaining information from ESC
A rather from ESC B when SA 2 obtains information from
ESC A. Hence, the strategy profile where both the SAs obtain
information ESC A is a Nash equilibrium when p˜A is small
enough. Note that it is the unique Nash equilibrium since the
strategy profile where both the SAs obtain information from
ESC B is not sustainable when p˜A is small.
Also note that if p˜A or p˜B is not small, SA 2 may have a
monopoly in this scenario if L if α is small enough or L is
very small.
If
W − L
L
→ 0, note from Theorems 3 and Theorem 4
that the price strategy of SA 2 is zero when the SAs will
obtain information from the same ESC if α > 0. Thus, the
equilibrium where SAs will obtain information from the same
ESC is not sustainable.
Note from Theorem 5 that if 0 < α < 1/2, the price strategy
of SA 2 is zero when SA 2 obtains information from ESC
B and SA 1 obtains information from ESC A. Only when
16
W − L
L
≥ qBα
2/qA + α− 2α2
2(1− α)2 , SA 2 selects a positive price
in the equilibrium. From Corollary 1 (in Section 5.1), there is
an α for which the price strategy of SA 2 is positive. Hence,
SA 2 attains a positive profit if p˜B is small when SA 1 obtains
information from ESC A, and SA 2 obtains information from
ESC B.
